ABSTRACT This article examines the evolving political culture in contemporary South Africa. It draws on elite culture, neo-patrimonialism, and revisionist institutionalist perspectives to understand state weaknesses and patterns of politicization confronting South Africa's developing democracy. While it accepts that the democratic political system and its constituent institutions are in place and function formally, a discourse of violence or threats of violence to rival political actors is commonplace. The article is structured as follows: the first part describes the increased social mobilization of disgruntled citizens who rely on a discourse of violence rather than articulating grievances through political structures; the second part focuses on those factors that ferment this kind of political culture. The article discusses the deepening economic inequality and its expression in class conflict under conditions of democracy. It then discusses the politics of the ANC as a dominant party, and in particular intra-elite conflict, ANC factionalization, and the consequent weakening of state institutions. These factors, the paper argues, encourage a politics in which political society, rather than civil society, becomes the main terrain for expressing conflict.
Introduction
After we recognize the existence of procedural democracy in South Africa, notice that it mostly functions according to formal rules established in the constitution, and appreciate the mammoth struggle and sacrifices involved to bring it about, it is as difficult to ignore the signs of state and institutional decay, intra-elite conflict, growing popular discontent, and political fragility in the face of society's demands and development challenges. South Africa's democratic political culture, 1 this paper will argue, shows signs of crisis: the democratic political system and its constituent institutions are in place and formally function, but the consequences of messy dominant party rule produces a political culture where a discourse of violence or threats of violence to rival political actors or merely to express demands is commonplace. Whenever social forces mobilize for even non-political ends a violent discourse threatening to others lies close to the surface. A discerning feature of politics has developed in which conflict is increasingly located on the terrain of political society and not, as hopeful democratic political theory postulates, on an ever-evolving civic tradition.
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The current situation raises many questions. Where did the promise of 1994-a constitutional democracy founded on a strong civic tradition-run aground? Why has South African society become so difficult to govern? In comparison to many third world and particularly African states, at independence the ANC inherited an abundance of popular legitimacy and enviable state capacity. Why has establishing civic order based on effective state capacity and ethical politics proven so elusive? The democracy so valued by Lipset, Tocqueville, and Marx, among many others, grounded in the modern historical experience of the west and 'the civic tradition', seems a distant and perhaps even unachievable idea. Is the identification of a 'lack' and failing of democracy importantly also a problem of theory (Mitchell, 2000) , an understanding of modernity, democracy and capitalism grounded in a European experience that is unlikely to be replicated, as Fanon warns, in places like South Africa with its particular histories and contexts?
Setting aside the long history of violence that accompanied racial capitalism and its legacy, this article examines the particular contemporary moment of South Africa's democratic experiment: one that focuses on the seeming inability to institutionalize democracy beyond the absence of open violence and the mere existence of democratic institutions that function imperfectly. The main responsibility for this state of affairs, it will argue, lies in the messy evolution of dominant party rule and its implications for South African democracy, especially the evolving political culture. Three related and distinct outcomes are discernible: unsatisfied citizen expectations and endless reporting of ethical and efficiency failings of the elite have produced political malaise, especially among the middle classes in the body politic (Johnson, 2009) ; the conflation of party and state institutions hastened party factional conflict, producing state weaknesses (Netshitenze, 2010) ; and lastly, political society becomes the dominant political terrain and not civil society, as classic democratic theory predicts.
The explanatory framework that I propose draws on incorporating elite culture, neo-patrimonialism, and revisionist institutionalist perspectives, to highlight party-state dynamics and the dominant patterns of politicization in a developing democracy like South Africa 'when the state can influence the life chances of many social groups' (Kohli, 1990, p. 10) . The structure of the article is as follows: the first part describes those aspects of a crisis in democratic political culture, especially as indicated by the increased social mobilization of disgruntled citizens who rely on a discourse of violence rather than articulating grievances through political structures. I then focus on the factors that ferment this kind of political culture. I discuss the deepening economic inequality and its expression T. REDDY in class conflict under conditions of democracy where, increasingly, we see a mobilized society driven by a resource-distributional politics. I then discuss the politics of the ANC as dominant party, and in particular intra-elite conflict, ANC factionalization, and the consequent weakening of state institutions. These factors encourage a politics in which political society, rather than civil society, becomes the main terrain for expressing conflict.
Heightened expectations, political malaise, crisis of political culture
Following the demise of apartheid as state ideology, during the past decade and a half South African politics has been a rollercoaster, and political turbulence is now taken for granted. In the national political discourse, upbeat expectations and excitement follow periods of gloom where pessimists predict impending crises and disasters around the corner. Yet there have been political, sporting and economic moments that encourage optimism: the relatively peaceful elections of 1994 when, after years of political violence, all citizens were able to participate for the first time, and those of 1999, 2004 and 2009 ; the victory in the rugby World Cup in 1995 and the successful hosting of other globally recognized sporting events, such as the recent 2010 soccer World Cup; the impressive economic growth accompanied by low inflation and interest rates between 1999 and 2003. There are, however, many more pressing issues some of which pessimists and cynics choose to emphasize. Some will focus on frightening HIV/AIDS statistics and government's slow, bewildering and ineffective response; others will point to the multiple scandals and endemic corruption, especially the Arms Deal announced in 1998, in which the ruling ANC and its leaders remain deeply embroiled (Feinstein, 2007) . And still others will emphasize the factional conflicts in the ANC (Southall, 1998; Lodge, 2004) and the undermining of key state institutions (Johnson, 2009) . Some argue that 'redeploying' ruling party members to state positions because they were blatantly unqualified or unwilling to take their jobs seriously severely weakened state capacity (Politicsweb, 2009) . And yet again others, in everyday political culture, will point to growing unemployment, declining services, and increased crime and personal insecurity and exclaim, using a familiar Afrikaans expression of exasperation, 'We are gatvol [fed up]!'
Since the mid-1990s we have witnessed increased social mobilization among poor communities, students, and workers frustrated with the channels of the democratic political system. Citizens regularly protest outside courts in support of an accused, or to demand severe punishments in cases of rape and armed robberies. Community protests over 'service delivery,' worker strikes for higher wages, xenophobic attacks on mainly black foreigners living in poor areas, and political demonstrations against government policies or political office bearers are common and almost always couched in threatening, angry, violent discourse. As often happens in politicized societies, violent words become violent action. A long list of examples can be cited. The prolonged and violent South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU) strike in 2008, the municipal workers' strikes organized by the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) in 2009, and the Zuma and Sheik court demonstrations (Gunner, 2008) . According to the Freedom of Expression Institute, over 30,000 community protests-6,000 recorded in the 2004/5 financial year alone (Delaney, 2007 )-come to mind. It is reported that some 15 social delivery protests take place every day, many of which have been banned by the police (Delaney, 2007) .
Three incidents reported in Independent Online on 15 September 2005 alone suggest that poor people often rely on the violent demonstration of protest as being more effective than normal democratic channels in order to articulate their interests and grievances. In one article students from a high school in Alexandra township near Johannesburg protested outside the Wynberg court, because a suspect 'got off' too easily. According to the report, 'The pupils, all from Kwabekhilanga High School in Alexandra, . . . held a demonstration outside the Wynberg magistrate's court in protest against the court's freeing on R500 a father who had allegedly murdered his teenage daughter. . . .The pupils were angry that the suspect was seen walking freely in the community' (Louw, 2005) . On the way home from court, students attacked informal traders, turning over their stalls and stealing some of their goods. A violent clash ensued. The police eventually chased the students back into the township. In the same township on the same day protestors stoned and burned a Metrorail train which arrived late. The fire spread to five coaches and only after some time were the trains running normally (Louw, 2005) . Then, in the small town of St Helena, residents of a poor shack community killed two people in a protest over police handling of gangsterism. Gangsters stabbed a member of the community when he refused their demand for a cigarette. The ANC in the area pointed out that the conflict was not 'racial' but involved a community composed of Africans and Coloureds against gangsterism and crime. The community attacked the police.
Consider another example in April 2009, one more expression of the longstanding tension between an organized taxi industry and the state, in which members of the United Taxi Association Forum, representing 13 taxi associations, brought morning traffic in congested downtown Johannesburg to a standstill. During the protest against the government's proposed Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system, a bus driver was shot in the hand, scores of bus drivers and commuters were intimidated into boycotting buses or exiting buses they were on already, and in downtown Johannesburg protestors brandished weapons and threatened onlookers and the police. Police responded with rubber bullets. Presumably because the April 2009 elections were imminent the demonstrators marched to the ANC headquarters where they submitted a protest memorandum to the ANC secretary-general, Gwede Mantashe, while also roughing him up. A leader of the association threatened a national strike if Mantashe and the ANC did not respond favourably. The chairman of the Witwatersrand Taxi Association by the name of Amon Majosi, representing 1,300 owners and 2,500 drivers, threatened, in a language the public has gotten accustomed to, 'Maybe it's going to be five days. The Confederations Cup, we are going to disrupt it . . . There is no way the BRT project can go ahead without the taxi industry. This is our business and we are serving 75% in transport. There is no way the BRT can continue without us' (Bleby, 2009) . That day, the ANC's secretary-general promised to respond sympathetically to their concerns. In a move typical of the ambiguity the ruling elite finds itself in, a day later the organization released a statement criticising the protest while reiterating its support for the BRT to be implemented. Similarly, Satawu, the main Cosatu-affiliated union that organizes the transport sector which itself led a violent security guard strike in 2006 (Mail and Guardian Online, 2006 ) also strongly criticized the demonstration, and its secretary-general, Randall Howard, pointed out that 'an industry that could not engage constructively and maturely when it did not agree with government policies could no longer be tolerated ' (News24, 2009) .
Another illustration was the Khutsong protest which recently ended after a campaign waged since 2005. Here a small community on the 'border' between the North West and Gauteng provinces waged an at first peaceful, then violent campaign to resist demarcating the area under the North West provincial administration, a region poorer than the more wealthy province of Gauteng, where they wanted to be. The campaign was led by local ANC and South African Communist Party (SACP) executive members, particularly Jomo Magale, a local school teacher, Paul Ncwane, a former soccer star, and young activist Siphiwe Nkutha (Mail and Guardian Online, 2006) . They were local members of the ANC and the SACP, but when the government refused to change the decision, Mogale led a violent protest against ANC government structures. Libraries and schools were burnt down and the 2004 elections and matric examinations were boycotted. Running battles with the police continued for years and when the ANC Alliance and the government were unable to resolve this issue even after many interventions, the state caved in. The demands of this community and its leaders were recognized, a victory influenced substantially by the victory of the Zuma faction following the Polokwane ANC national conference in December 2007 (Kirshner & Phokela, 2010) . The ANC state was unable to implement its policy after successful social mobilization and divisions within ruling party ranks. Other communities protesting demarcation issues such as Matatiele in KwaZulu-Natal, and Moutse in Mpumalanga, have been unsuccessful until now; these communities opted not to take the route of Khutsong, with its prolonged social mobilization and violent protest. Recently, another border dispute has flared up, this time during the tenure of the Zuma administration, in which the Tembeshile community threatened to boycott the national election; indications suggest that it intends to follow the successful Khutsong model. This 'new' phenomenon of social mobilization of disgruntled, mainly poor citizens (Hough, 2008; Grobler, 2009; Bond, 2010) often evokes continuities in cultural expression and practices-slogans, songs, dance, posters and style of speeches-with the discourses of internal revolt associated with the 1980s' mass uprisings in South African urban townships (Gunner, 2008) . The patterns of social mobilization associated with the 1980s went through a lull during the first few years of democracy, but then resurfaced as state inefficiencies, macroeconomic policy and dominant party practice invited social mobilization. Yet the political systemic contexts are quite obviously different. Under apartheid, racial divisions and inequalities presented conditions for social mobilization; blacks at minimum demanded full democratic participation in the political system. Interestingly, a cultural strand of the 1980s' social mobilization strongly influenced by the military struggle, emphasizing 'enemies,' a reliance on force to reach intended outcomes, and an umbrella of ideas and practices associated with militarist campaigns, has not faded away, but actually resurfaced more vigorously in the social mobilizations under democratic conditions. The citizen participation encouraged by the democratic system-electoral politics, lobbying of interests, and influencing public deliberation and agenda-have taken root and demonstrates aspects of a developing civil society discourse, but this has not replaced or overcome a discourse that relies on the aggressive, violent strands of the social mobilization patterns of the 1980s. What are the factors that explain these aspects of South Africa's evolving political culture?
The widening class condition, a strain on democracy
The continuing and ever-widening inequality between rich and poor, which for historical reasons strongly overlaps with race, has not helped the development of a civil society discourse. It puts pressure on the democratic institutions and undermines the development of a national civic culture (Lipset, 1959) . As a ruling party the ANC prioritized addressing the racial tensions produced by apartheid. However, the efforts made at ideological and cultural levels, as for example in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process, sit uneasily with the neo-liberal economic policy adopted in 1996.
This policy has made no significant dent in black poverty and inequality (Natress and Seekings, 2001) , although poverty when defined by the meagre R322 poverty line showed a slight reduction from 53% in 1995 to 48% in 2005 due to the intervention of state welfare policies. The government's own Fifteen Year Review (SA Government, 2008) acknowledges that income inequality has widened. Head of Policy in the President's Office, Joel Netshitenze, speaking on research conducted by the presidency, admitted that growth did not necessarily translate into reductions in poverty, and that the most well-off in the society often benefit the most (Apple, 2008) . South Africa has one of the highest rates of inequality, with its Gini coefficient competing with Brazil for the most unequal country in the world, and this situation is glaringly visible in everyday interactions between citizens. Shanty towns and grinding poverty sit side by side with ostentatious expressions of wealth. This inequality trivializes the principles of equality enshrined in the Constitution, if not seriously undermining the democratic political institutions.
If the Mandela administration reaped the benefits of the post-apartheid honeymoon period, the Mbeki government was forced to make more difficult choices. The adoption of the fiscally conservative Growth, Employment and Redistribution macro-economic programme (GEAR) instead of the more pro-poor Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) fuelled tensions. The ANC first embarked on the state-interventionist RDP as its policy to address poverty and inequality. From 1994 to 1996 a watered-down version of the original RDP campaigned for in the first election was adopted as policy to guide all other government policies. With state intervention in strategic sectors, it aimed to redistribute wealth through the provision of services and infrastructure (Lundahl, 1999; Terreblanche, 2002) and by explicitly valuing direct participation in local development. However, the government abandoned the RDP in favour of more market-orientated solutions, citing problems of implementing RDP projects, funding shortages, lack of promised foreign investment and a fluctuating currency (Ramos, 1997) . Rather than focusing on distribution without significant capitalist growth, GEAR amounted to a domestically designed structural adjustment programme, advocating a variety of policies intended to inspire economic growth through increased foreign investment. This macro-economic policy aimed to encourage direct foreign investment, exports of South African goods, and the role of the market in the allocation of goods and services, resulting in job creation and thus redistribution (Ramos, 1997) .
In the context of the negotiated settlement, and the constraints of the global economy exerted by the IMF and World Bank, the Mbeki government found itself in the contradictory position of implementing an austere macro-economic policy that was decidedly neo-liberal and favoured business interests, while also aiming to accommodate the expectations of its supporters for far-reaching redress (Andreasson, 2006) . The GEAR policy has produced economic growth (but not as high as the predicted six per cent annual growth rate), stable inflation, and unchanged mass unemployment. In general, South Africa has been experiencing what many call 'jobless growth' (Heintz, 1997; Osborn, 1997; Lundahl, 1999; Terreblanche, 2002) . The Mbeki government has been criticized for embracing a disappointingly technocratic approach towards development, especially in the context of the aftermath of the radicalization of black politics in the 1980s, where people's participation was highly valued. At the same time, the policy has been lauded by national business, creating much stronger ties between the ruling party and the business sector.
Ideologically, GEAR relied on a narrower coalition of 'modernizing' groupsthe nationalist elite (the direct beneficiaries of the governments' Black Economic Empowerment policies), established white business, the broad black middle class, and ethnic elites. These groups formed the backbone of the state's developmental trajectory (Southall & Tangri, 2008) . It consequently alienated the organized working class, the rural and urban poor, the lumpen elements, and the unemployed (Southall, 2009) . During the Mbeki years the classic class divides among blacks assumed prominence, placing the party in the difficult position of deciding how to retain its mass popular support base. Mbeki's domineering and cynical approach to the Alliance partners produced inevitable tensions and internal opposition not unrelated to economic policy (Andreasson, 2006) . The policy motivated the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), two of the ANC's alliance partners who were not consulted on the policy, to support Jacob Zuma against Mbeki for the ANC presidency at the party's Polokwane conference in 2007 (Ceruti, 2008) .
Related to the GEAR policy was the government's intention to de-racialize the economy by supporting black business, a policy known as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). Despite the government's intention to present a single meaning of BEE in policy, there are multiple meanings in relation to particular paradigms (Southall, 2005 (Southall, , 2008 . The conflict over the precise meaning of the term is ultimately a political fight about the direction of South Africa's economic development, the class orientation of the ANC, and the nature of democracy, both within and outside the ruling ANC. The voices in the debate are often those of old allegiances-nationalists and socialists-but there are also voices that articulate a variety of overlapping positions (Southall, 2005) .
In a 2005 debate, Blade Nzimande, the Secretary-General of the SACP, described BEE as 'white captains of industry and finance . . . [lending] an aspirant upwardly mobile elite the membership fees to the country club and the keys to the Porsche' (Nzimande, 2005) . He distinguishes between 'narrow' and 'broad-based' BEE. The former being the high-profile transactions witnessed since the mid1990s involving a small elite of beneficiaries. The latter, which he advocates, is the transformation of material conditions for the mass of the unemployed and poor, with a far-reaching distribution of wealth and resources. In the dominant narrow version, a 'black-owned consortium' buys equity shares in one or another of South Africa's larger corporations or state enterprises; in another version, black leaders are appointed to senior positions in company management (Johnson, 2009) .
Criticisms of this type of BEE include the following: a) the 'black-owned consortium' of investors is often a small group of individuals made privately rich by such transactions; b) those selected by white capital are members of, or former members of, or have close ties to members of, the ruling ANC (thus revealing the underlying logic as political rather than market-driven or merit-based); c) the final agreements do not demonstrate how the many transactions will benefit 'disadvantaged South Africans' more broadly; d) the transactions do not make a dent in the established patterns of ownership in the national economy; e) many questions remain about the transparency of the deals; and f) ultimately questions are raised as to whether this kind of BEE constitutes 'de-racialization' in the wider society to any significant degree. Nzimande believes that this kind of BEE fails to address the real transformational challenges facing South Africa. Similar criticisms of BEE have been made by former Archbishop Desmond Tutu (2004) , the media, and many academics (Johnson, 2009 ). Heribert Adam et al. (1998) label this the advent of 'crony capitalism', similar to that seen in the South Asian countries of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea.
Saki Macozoma, a former member of the ANC national executive, defends BEE. He accuses critics of expecting BEE to usher in socialism, an outcome that BEE was not designed to accomplish. He argues that '[m]any critics of BEE accept the need to de-racialize the economy, but they think that the process has "elitist consequences". It is not alleviating poverty, but enriching the few', and he asks '[w]hat did they expect? Where have you ever seen a capitalist system producing socialist results?' (Macozoma, 2005) . There is a need, he maintains, to encourage black people to take up the opportunities offered by BEE. Even without significant shifts in societal class relations, BEE represents at a minimum 'de-racialization' of the business class; it has helped create a bigger black middle class and more black businesses. It can be argued that blacks in management will make a company more sensitive to black interests and that such companies will represent themselves in ways that address a broader historically marginalized community. And certainly, he argues, de-racialization of any sector of South African society is a step forward from a segregated 'racial' monopoly. Macozoma is correct that those who criticize BEE have another political agenda. Their socialist paradigm views BEE as amounting to a series of partial reforms, leaving intact the exploitation of the majority of people, a situation inherited from the apartheid era (Bond, 2009 ). For them, BEE constitutes a 'sell-out' when it comes to the real demands of transformation -a more egalitarian society, not a market-driven capitalism.
The decline of the ANC as the main integrating institution
The increase in social mobilization in the post-1994 democratic context puts enormous pressure on the main integrating institutions, especially the ANC. The party sees itself as the head of a broad democratic movement engaged in a national democratic revolution (NDR), and therefore ambiguously encourages a politics of mobilization, a strategy more recently associated with particular factional elites. However, when poor and desperate people participate in forms of social mobilization that the state is unable to control, the ruling party then falls back on a 'rule of law' discourse. This ambiguity has contributed towards the decline of state capacity, the politicization of social demands, the further fragmentation of society, and political malaise.
The ANC-the leading organization and symbol of the struggle for freedomstarted off with impressive legitimacy. It was able to extend its reach throughout the country into small towns, rural areas and heavily populated urban areas. The new leaders rightly claimed to rule on behalf of the majority. The ANC could conceivably be considered the institutional foundation of national unity. During the anti-apartheid struggle, particularly through the successful strategies of the United Democratic Front (UDF), the ANC mobilized support from a diverse cross-section of South African society. During the formative years of democracy, the ANC's legitimacy provided much-needed stability by bestowing legitimacy on the new political dispensation even though it was a product of compromises with white minority interests.
The fragile state of the political sphere now is a far cry from the heady days of the mid-1990s following the first democratic election. A stable and democratic South Africa after three centuries of racial domination and conflict began with a relatively peaceful democratic transition, producing a hybrid political system that allowed for both majoritarian and consensus features (Koeble, 1998) . A proportional representation party list electoral system encouraged small political party representation but still, unsurprisingly, the ANC won overwhelmingly in the first and the three following elections with a mandate from over 60% of the voting population. Its dominance of the party and political system is the central feature of South African politics (Southall, 1998; Giliomee & Simkins, 1999; Reddy, 2005; Kadima, 2006) .
The idea of a dominant political party sits uncomfortably with liberal democratic theory and the conventional literature on political parties and democracy (Kothari, 1964; Zolberg, 1966) . The Schumpetarian notion of democracy, which places emphasis on elite selection and elections, so uncritically embraced by conventional political science, highlights the importance of political parties in democratic polities (Huntington, 1991; Ihonvbere & Mbaku, 2006) . Political parties are said to play important roles in all political systems: articulating the demands of citizens, aggregating interests, educating citizens by competing with other organizations, linking societal concerns with governing structures, and selecting leadership elites. When citizens freely select new rulers and policies in regular competitive elections the rulers are held accountable to the citizenry. In many of Huntington's 'old democracies' (Huntington, 1991) regular alternation between two or three larger parties has become the norm. The element of 'uncertainty' has become central to evaluating the quality of democracy using this norm.
According to critics single-party dominance falls short of the classic competitive party model because the uncertainty of electoral outcome is largely absent (Kothari, 1964) . The long-term prospects for democracy are unfavourable because the dominant party undermines the opposition, centralizes power in party structures, and undervalues the broad-minded tolerance which all democratic societies require so the many and diverse preferences of citizens can be heard within the political system (Zolberg, 1966) . The criticism of ANC dominance in South Africa follows similar lines. Some argue, unpersuasively, that rather than integrating society it further fragments it by undermining the rights of minorities. ANC dominance, they argue, represents a 'racial' majority perpetually keeping out of power parties claiming to represent minorities. It delegitimizes these opposition parties, constantly attacking them for unpatriotic behaviour that goes against the will of the majority (Giliomee & Simkins, 1999) . More persuasive is the argument that there is little questioning of the executive in parliamentary systems because members toe the party line. This is further enhanced in the party list PR electoral system of South Africa where party representatives fear the loss of their seats should the party bosses decide to remove them (Southall, 1994; Southall, 1998; Lodge, 1999) . The party control of the state suffocates civil society, which reduces the democratic space, and blurs the line between the party and the state, which reduces accountability and increases corruption (Southall, 1998; Adam, 1999; Lodge, 1999) .
In societies undergoing democratic transition which are deeply divided ethnically and racially and have large numbers of poor people, a reliance on the classic model, drawn largely from the 'Western' experience of a few countries, seems to be misplaced. Dominant party rule has important positive features, especially in newly democratizing societies where the potential for social instability is high. Arian and Barnes (1974) argue that '[t]he dominant party system suggests a model of how democracy and stability may be combined under difficult conditions'. It enhances party competition, it democratically mobilizes citizens to participate in the political system, and it provides for stable government, and ultimately it should be appreciated for providing 'stability in fragmented polities '. Friedman (1999) rightly gives prominence to the democratic internal structure of the ANC and its historical commitment to a plural democracy. Reddy (2005) similarly emphasizes the relative openness of the ANC. He argues, following Kothari (1964) , that the ANC shares many of the features of the Indian Congress 'system' in which internal factions co-operate with external opposition parties to keep the ruling party pragmatic in internal factional management, sensitive to opposition party concerns, and cohesive enough to bring the majority into the political system. Adam (1999) draws attention to the ANC's role in dampening the heightened expectations of the poor and acknowledges that the dominant party brings long-term stability, offers short-term safeguards for fearful minorities, and allows democratic institutions to take root. Suttner (2006) criticizes the notion of a 'dominant party' as intrinsically conservative because it assumes only an electoral, bourgeois type of democracy, rather than one based on popular participation and decision-making. The ANC in South Africa always contained this potential to represent working and poor peoples' interests in a genuine sense.
Factionalist politics takes hold in the ANC
In the past, those who wrote sympathetically about ANC dominance (mostly in the early to mid-1990s) all assumed a relatively unified ANC, with its internal factions contributing towards ANC stability and internal openness. This state of affairs changed dramatically with the protracted conflict over leadership between the Zuma and Mbeki factions and its consequences for the state and civil society.
Organizations that have been around for a long time (the ANC will celebrate its centenary in 2012) and are located in deeply divided societies are bound to develop a factionalist character. According to Maor (1997) , 'the party's character is determined by the conditions which make for durability in the factions' relations to the party'. The foremost challenge facing party managers is the maintenance of internal order and coherence. Where internal factions (constituting the 'broad church' of the ANC) were once considered a strength, a condition that kept the party relatively open and sensitive to diverse views in and outside its immediate domain (Reddy, 2005) , in the post-1997 period (after the 1997 Mafikeng national conference) they have been fighting fiercely, sacrificing the coherence of the party in the process. The play of pragmatic interaction between factions that characterized the ANC for most of its history and was considered the unique attribute accounting for its success, its adaptive ability and its capacity to remain coherent (Reddy, 2005) , had come to an end.
Internal factional conflict inspired by competition for state positions, tenders and access to favours from business has become vicious, sometimes violent. While the ANC rather incomprehensibly denies the existence of factions in official statements, a stance typical of all political parties (Belloni & Beller, 1976) , the media and academic observers interpret disputes in the party as factional (Butler, 2010) . Factional groups battling for party and public office have used the media to discredit rivals, to control branches. They have used not only subtle forms of internal party intrigue but also violent attacks and assassinations to promote their interests (Mail and Guardian Online 2010). Instead of expressing a national consensus, typical of its historical mandate to serve as the 'parliament of the people', the ANC has become the source of division which is spilling over to other sectors of the society because of its continued dominance of the political system. This institutional foundation of the political system has been tearing itself apart in the past few years.
The battles for the ANC presidency between the third-term bid of Mbeki and Zuma before the Polokwane national conference in 2007 and the corruption scandal surrounding the role of then Deputy President Zuma and his financial advisor Shabir Shaik became the driving issues behind the emergence of brutal factional conflict, with each faction identified with a leading personality. The Zuma charges relate to the massive arms deal signed by the government in 1999 (the most prominent of the corruption scandals since 1994) and involving many legal and political twists and turns since 2001. This deal has sparked public attention and exposed the internal workings and rivalries within the party, which prefers to keep its dirty laundry hidden. The factions chose opposing discourses of democracy to interpret the Zuma investigation-Mbeki and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) chose the importance of the rule of law and the fight against corruption, while Zuma and his allies chose the abuse of state power by Mbeki and the fact that one is presumed innocent unless convicted in a court of law. The conviction for corruption in 2005 of Zuma's friend Shaik (paroled on account of ill health in April 2009 after serving three years of a 15-year sentence-the subject of intense dispute in the media), Mbeki's removal of Zuma as deputy president of the country, and the ongoing legal battles waged by Zuma to defend himself against prosecution, have intensified the factionalist identities within the ruling party (Ceruti, 2008) . These events led to the dramatic showdown at the ANC's national conference in Polokwane, the victory of the Zuma faction in party elections, the recall of Mbeki in September 2008 and the formation of a splinter party, the Congress of the People (COPE), consisting of loyal Mbeki supporters, in November 2008.
Competition for leadership positions in the ANC, often described metaphorically as the 'Mbeki-Zuma' factional conflict, has exacerbated factional divisions at other levels and structures of the party as well. We witness intense leadership struggles in the Free State, the Eastern Cape, Gauteng, Limpopo, the Western Cape and the North West. During the Mbeki years, provincial tensions were exacerbated when the National Executive Committee (NEC) supported one factional candidate chosen by the president, while rivals had local provincial delegate support (Lodge, 2004) , suggesting a dynamic set of relations between factions and the hierarchical structures of the organization. The tensions between the central headquarters (Luthuli House) and the provinces and between regional executive committees and sectional branches are expressed as support for either the Mbeki or the Zuma factions (Zuma, 2008) . These tensions have played themselves out in various ways. In the North West and the Western Cape, factional differences made branch structures virtually inactive, directly affecting the organization's ability to wage its 2009 electoral campaign. Luthuli House imposed its will by mandating a separate committee to oversee the organization in these regions. Even this move did not necessarily reduce tensions. In the North West province disagreements continue over who holds power, the Luthuli House nominee Lumka Yengeni (associated with Zuma) or the provincial secretary, Supra Mahumapelo, a Mbeki supporter. While Yengeni claimed to be in charge of the organization in the region (accountable only to Luthuli House), Mahumapelo insisted that Yengeni had to report to the provincial executive and submit a report to it (Mataboge, 2009) . Similar tensions are evident in the Western Cape between Chris Nissen, chosen by Luthuli House to manage the electoral campaign, and the secretary-general and Zuma supporter Mcebisi Skwatsha.
The ANC was once widely respected and supported globally as a progressive nationalist movement; now unruliness is rife in its ranks and it no longer surprises us to read reports, at one time unthinkable, of 'comrades' violently attacking each other. Now factional divisions dominate the identities of members. A language of violence and threats permeates internal relations as members compete for lucrative government positions. Leaders are no longer averse to mobilizing supporters through personal ties and patronage. Moral and ideological commitments rarely characterize the dominant discourse in the party or the party's relations with society, except during elections, to remind supporters about apartheid and its brutal crimes against black people. Internal ANC party conflicts, festering since the early 1990s, spill over to weaken state and civil society institutions. Party leaders readily and regularly attack state and legal institutions, accusing them of supporting or acting against one or other factional leader, in the ANC itself or rival party. The legal system and the judiciary have come under sustained attack by some members of the ruling party who, wanting to protect their leader Jacob Zuma from prosecution for corruption, accuse the former leader of the party and president, Thabo Mbeki, of using state structures against party rivals.
The negative impact of party division on the state
These intra-elite conflicts not only undermined the dominant political party but also eroded key institutions such as sections of the executive, Parliament, the Courts and various democracy-enhancing Chapter Nine institutions. Unfortunately no other institutions could take its place and fulfil the national integrating and consensus-creating functions desperately needed in this developing democracy. This decline in the state's capacity to govern has begun in the context of the unfolding HIV/AIDS crisis, high unemployment and criminal activity, economic uncertainties associated with the global capitalist recession, and the frustrations and anger expressed in social delivery protests.
The dominant position of the ANC in the political system means that conflict among the party elite, if not strictly managed to enhance civic traditions, can easily undermine the effectiveness of political institutions. The collapsing of party and state structures, the party's attempt to assert its hegemony through its 'redeployment policy' from the Mafikeng conference onwards (ANC, 2002) , and the idea that party members ought to control the levers of power throughout the society to accelerate transformation increased the patronage accessible to ANC members. 'Redeployment' meant inevitably that ANC weaknesses affected state institutions. The notion of differentiating party from state structures poses a problem, as historically and ideologically the dominant view in ANC political culture, enunciated in the NDR concept, is that the state serves as an instrument to transform society (ANC, 1998) .
While the political institutions do, supposedly, function according to the minimal rules and procedures set out in the constitution, widespread scepticism prevails over the decline in the proper ethical functioning of political institutions. Let us consider just one example (from a range of possible cases, such as various investigations into the arms deal, the dropping of charges by the NPA against Zuma without taking it to court, the early release of Shabir Schaik, and so on) -the firing by Acting President Kgalema Motlanthe of Vusi Pikoli, the state prosecutor who headed the NPA. The NPA investigated and aimed to prosecute Zuma, the president of the ANC, for corruption. Under pressure from many quarters during almost eight years of legal wrangling, it eventually dropped charges against Zuma two weeks before the 2009 elections, when it concluded (on the basis of secret tape recordings) that its lead investigator was working with key members of the Mbeki faction. During this saga, unsurprisingly to political cynics, Motlanthe, who is associated with the Zuma faction, ratified the decision of former president Mbeki to dismiss Pikoli. The latter was appointed by Mbeki in 2005 and then dismissed in November 2007 by the president for investigating and deciding to charge a close Mbeki ally, the national police commissioner, Jackie Selebi (who was convicted of corruption in July 2010). The pressure from the media and opposition parties led Mbeki to appoint a commission to inquire into the Pikoli dismissal headed by a leading ANC member, the former Speaker of Parliament, Frene Ginwala. The commission was to investigate whether Pikoli was 'fit for office' and determine whether there was an 'irretrievable breakdown' in the relationship between the relevant minister and the national prosecutor (something not required by the NPA Act). The Ginwala Commission recommended that Pikoli be reinstated to his job when it reported in November 2008 (Joubert & Roussouw, 2009 ), but criticized his lax leadership in appointing former apartheid police officers to the unit, which Mbeki and the Commission viewed as a 'national security threat' (ostensibly Mbeki's original reasoning for firing Pikoli). The Opposition parties in Parliament believed that Pikoli was fired because of the factional conflict between Mbeki and Zuma, and especially because of Pikoli's 'independent-minded' approach to his job-the constitutional requirement of this office.
Parliament reluctantly, given its past practice of ingratiating itself with the executive, appointed a 22-member committee (14 of whom were ANC members and 8 from opposition parties) to hear the matter and decide whether or not to endorse the president's decision. Controversially, some members of the committee were not considered neutral: in the past they had been under NPA investigation or influenced by party factional politics, or both. The chair of the committee, Oupa Monareng, had been prosecuted (by the NPA) for corruption (attempting to bribe a policeman) and charged with a R3,000 fine in 1996 (Mail and Guardian Online, 2009). Some members of the committee had been implicated in a previous parliamentary scandal involving the abuse of travel grants given to MPs and the NPA had prosecuted the worst offenders. Finally, ANC committee members had admitted even before the parliamentary committee sat that the decision to dismiss Pikoli had already been taken within ANC structures; they had agreed with President Kgalema Motlanthe and not the Ginwala Commission of Inquiry findings (IOL, 2009 ). In the end the committee farcically held hearings and took a vote in the president's favour. No rules were broken, but the ethical and political commitment of Parliament to hold the executive to account and thoroughly investigate the matter was undermined.
The damage to the legitimacy of parliamentary accountability, as well as the institution of Parliament itself, cannot be underestimated. The ANC won a round in the immediate political battles, but the country had one of its central political institutions undermined because members chose to uncritically follow the ruling party line. Other examples could be chosen to substantiate this point empirically. The more well-known would include the Office of the Public Protector and the parliamentary finance committee (Scopa) investigating aspects of the arms deal, the now widely held belief that the office of the presidency during the Mbeki years was 'interfering in party matters', hundreds of disputed appointments to public office, and the many BEE deals involving ANC members (Bond, 2009; Johnson, 2009) . Recent studies-the Asmal Commission on Chapter Nine bodies, the government 10-and 15-year reviews, and ANC internal documents and speeches-support these observations of state weaknesses, yet they all adopt a narrow technical view and not a broad political analysis implicating the ANC itself.
The ANC elite, patronage and social mobilization
Competing elites in the ANC and in the various political parties benefit from and take advantage of the mobilization of mass support to enhance their individual interests by gaining recognition and placing their interests on the political agenda, and consequently being rewarded with higher office. After decades of racial discrimination, democratic politics has opened up politics as a lucrative career. An ANC survey of members in the comparatively wealthy province of Gauteng indicate that most members joined between 1990 and 1994, and that some 42% of ordinary members and 31% of office bearers were unemployed (ANC, 2006) . As many as 45% of ordinary members and 36% of leaders surveyed said that they experienced periods when they had to go hungry (ANC, 2006) . Slightly over half the members earn between R299 and R2,999 per month and only 24% have a post-matric education. In the vastly poorer provinces, with large unemployed and semi-rural populations of the Eastern Cape, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal, average incomes of ANC members will be much lower than in Gauteng. ANC membership in these provinces grew massively in the post-1994 period, with most only joining in the last decade (Faul, 2007) . For leaders whose limited background education and qualifications (mostly due to apartheid discrimination) would normally make upward mobility challenging, politics offers an escape from poverty and marginalization. Crucially, this requires supporting the appropriate factional leader and becoming associated with the group likely to be successful in social mobilization (Sanbrook, 1972) . Since politics is an attractive option for upward mobility and the assumption of political office directly affects standards of material reward, the political terrain becomes fiercely competitive.
Weber, in his 'Politics as a Vocation' (Weber, 1958) , distinguishes between those who enter politics with an independent means of income and those who rely entirely on politics. In South Africa, because of its history, the majority in the ANC leadership have less of a chance of a lucrative career outside politics, and this must affect how they would view politics in the post-apartheid period: as a means to an end. The white National Party also used its control of the state to allow members to move up the social ladder, but arguably its support base ultimately benefited given its representation of a small minority. This is less the case in the democratic period. Many leaders in the ANC have moved into lucrative political or economic positions with no independent means of income, or high levels of education, or previous experience in governance or administration (Shirley, 2010) . They do, however, have the skills of charismatic mobilizers-an equally important activity of politics-and have used these in many instances to encourage social mobilization for personal gain and not to benefit the mass of supporters (Netshitenze, 2010) .
The process involving Mbeki and the ANC share many uncanny similarities with events that produced the decline of the Congress Party in India. At its 100th anniversary celebration, the leader, Rajiv Gandhi, criticized the party for moving away from its noble traditions. Corrupt leaders were using it for private wealth accumulation, taking advantage of patronage relationships, using the poor, and working through power brokers. It is instructive that Mbeki made an identical call to the ANC at various forums in 2008, particularly at the National General Council and the National Conference. Yet, like Rajiv Gandhi, Mbeki has been as much a central cause of the party's internal deterioration. Ironically, like the Gandhis (Indira Gandhi as well as her sons), Mbeki aimed to respond to regional fragmentation and local elites taking over the party by imposing his own people, and to control provincial party structures from the centre, thus strengthening the party in relation to the polity. By surrounding himself with a few loyal supporters, centralizing decision-making in the office of the presidency and increasingly ignoring party matters, Mbeki contributed to the de-institutionalization of the national party. The paradox that Indira Gandhi faced, identified by Kohli, also applies to Mbeki's situation: '[t] he paradox is that the very strategy that enabled Indira Gandhi to hold on to power also undermined the possibility of using that power for constructive ends' (Kohli, 1990) . This strategy increases the personalization of party politics, as the party leader rather than institutional decision-making mechanisms becomes the central focus. In Mbeki's case it had the unintended effect of producing one more element in an anti-Mbeki coalition, disaffected regional bosses who bolstered the Zuma faction.
How can we make sense of the shifts taking place in the ANC from the Struggle to the democratic periods? The once enviable ANC party seems to have lost its moral compass and has steadily unravelled organizationally when not pressured to do so by competing political parties or organizations. The political practice of the nationalist elite has moved dramatically from a politics of community service and values associated with popular struggle and self-sacrifice to selfseeking special interests. From being participants in the anti-apartheid movement, which involved immense sacrifice, the party elite have become embroiled in a politics that offers the rewards of upward mobility. Its once ethically driven nationalist project has degenerated into many conflicts between factional elites who rely on the social mobilization of disgruntled groups to access the material rewards of patronage. To retain state power, leaders inevitably gravitate towards populist politics, aiming to create a direct link with followers by making all sorts of promises and dispensing state favours and goods just before elections, which undermines impersonal rules and institutions in the long term. This quest for a popular support base by making ill considered promises encourages loyalty to personalities or factions in the party. Those outside this circle are viewed with suspicion, and the worst possible motives are imputed to them, creating an uncivil political discourse. Is there an inevitability of this process, something rooted in the structural basis of fighting colonial situations by nationalist elites, as Fanon (1963) seemed to suggest?
It is possible to identify some more immediate reasons for the weakening of factional management. Clearly, the role of the ANC leaders who got caught up in the corrupt arms deal, and especially the leadership rivalry between Mbeki and Zuma and the way it was managed, played a central part, as Feinstein (2007) argues. But leadership conflicts and the battle over the general direction of the party-whether to continue with its 'struggle' characteristics or to become a modern political party (another narrative of the Zuma-Mbeki dispute)-maybe also relate to the failure of the ANC to successfully make the transition, as many mainstream political scientists argue, from liberation movement to political party participating in competitive elections (a common structural factor facing many nationalist movements) (Ottaway, 1991) . This is a bigger issue of party institutionalization. Arguably the ANC was ill prepared for too many of the societal challenges that it faced, in particular the exile component which assumed the key leadership positions of the organisation and government. Having operated underground and under clandestine military conditions it had the least experience with democratic culture and open politics. South African civil society is historically diverse and the mass mobilizations of the 1980s against apartheid created a populist experience that was difficult to control in a democratic context. Once the genie was out of the bottle it was difficult to put it back again in a political framework based on liberal procedural democracy. The relationship between the party and the society points to an emerging disjuncture between a party composed of different traditions and unable to keep up with the trajectory of changes taking place in civil society. This disjuncture is both the cause and the consequence of the weakening of the ANC and of a state that reacts rather than leads in South Africa's developing democracy.
Weak civic culture and the rise of political society
The article has argued that the structural condition of a widening class inequality, the decline of the ANC as the central integrating institution, a political elite factionally driven by the material rewards of public office, and the consequent weakening of key political institutions because of the collapsing of party and state in their everyday practices contribute to a political culture dominated by political society. Conventional democratic theory leads one to expect civil society to be the site for the regulation of disputes, but in contemporary South Africa we see instead the assertion of political society. Chatterjee (2003; has convincingly argued that in Western political theory the standard division between state and civil society inadequately applies to post-colonial societies. It is more useful to think of a domain of mediating institutions between civil society and the state, because only a small section of the population, the nationalist elite, occupies civil society and inhabits its characteristic of modern associational life, with its rights and obligations discourse. In the South African case political society as used in this article refers to that terrain where conflict, mostly over the distribution of resources, the recognition of rights of historically subjugated groups and the expression of subordinate culture, is fought out, often relying on a violent, desperate, and threatening discourse.
Political society has become the terrain for poor people to articulate their concerns, which 'bring into the hallways and corridors of power some of the squalor, ugliness and violence of popular life. But if one truly values the freedom and equality that democracy promises, then one cannot imprison it within the sanitized fortress of civil society' (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 74) . The establishment of orderly civic relations-the bedrock of middle-class values-is unable to establish itself, given the material conditions of economic and political life, as the dominant political culture, despite the provisions of the constitution and statements of the political elite.
Three explanations emerge from this analysis about the kind of the South African political culture currently evolving. The first is an argument that focuses on the political elites, especially managers in the ANC, emphasizing their inability to arrest the fragmentation of the organization but also ambiguously to encourage popular mobilization to promote their individual and sectional interests. The second is an equally persuasive neo-patrimonial argument demonstrating that South African society, like most third world societies, can be described in terms of relationships between patrons and clients, with the patrons (the political elite) offering positions and resources to the clients (Lemarchand, 1972; Kaufman, 1974; Theobald, 1982) . These networks of patrons and clients characterize the ruling party. These patron-client networks took root during the ANC exile period (Lodge 1992) , but in the post-1994 period the ANC's deployment policy, with its vastly increased access to state resources, has strengthened them.
These impressive explanations of weak institutions that emphasize elite culture (Putnam, 1993) , state patrimonialism (Clapham, 1985) and demands for increased participation (Huntington, 1965) individually are unable to adequately explain the assertiveness of political over civil society in South Africa's democracy. These tend to hold up civil society as the standard and narrowly define political society by reducing it primarily to electoral and party politics. The third interpretation (articulated here) complements the other two, but places emphasis on the way political society now becomes the arena in which political differences are fought out and civil society becomes less important for the majority of the population, except for the old and emerging middle class. It chooses not to ignore these perspectives, but to productively incorporate them into an account highlighting ambiguous dominant party politics and weak state capacities that encourage patterns of politicization of recently mobilized groups.
It should be hardly surprising that social mobilization for political ends, making demands for recognition and resources from the state, expresses itself in violent and often threatening protest. In developing democracies, trust and social capital in civil society, as written about by Putnam (1993) , hardly prevail, while in the trenches of political society, as Chatterjee observes, poor and marginalized groups wishing to effectively gain the goods of government programmes 'must succeed in applying the right pressure at the right places in the governmental machinery. This would frequently mean the bending or stretching of rules, because existing procedures have historically worked to exclude or marginalize them' (Chatterjee, 2004) . The combination of a factionally divided ANC, driven by a politics of patronage, and a desperate and historically marginalized majority, makes the achievement of a democratic civic tradition all the more elusive in South Africa.
Conclusion
The limitations of the political sphere suggest that a political culture that values citizen accountability, tolerance of political difference, and recognition and appreciation of the ethical foundations of democratic institutions and practices-albeit elements of an imagined civic tradition-remain elusive in contemporary South Africa. The widening class inequalities and messy evolution of the dominant party, especially party fragmentation and the reliance and appeal of state patronage, fuel an already existing climate of popular mobilization. The outcome is a type of politics, often referred to as 'robust,' where violence is less likely to hide behind the veil of law and civic sensibilities.
Notes * Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town, South Africa. Email: thiven.reddy@uct.ac.za. 1. I do not want to use the concept of 'political culture' to refer to citizen orientations towards the political system in the manner used by Almond and Verba (1963) . They define the concept as 'the ways in which political elites make decisions, their norms and attitudes, as well as the norms and attitudes of the ordinary citizen, his relation to government and to his fellow citizens. . .'. When the vast Western prejudice contained in their modernisation approach is diligently scrutinized, I appreciate the usefulness of this definition in a general sense. However, for our understanding of political culture I prefer the emphasis on everyday meanings and practice in constituting citizen identity as it relates to the conflicts over power in society. Also see Weeden, 2002. 2. The concepts 'state' and 'civil society' are most readily associated with Hegel, and taken up by Marx. See Hegel's Philosophy of Right and Marx's On the Jewish Question and German Ideology. In both instances civil society is defined as essentially bourgeois society, the terrain of private activity and association. In the German Ideology, Marx says 'Civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the development of the productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage. . .'. He sees it as the '. . .true source and theatre of all history. . .' (Marx, 1972) . Arato and Cohen in their seminal work on civil society (1994) want to distinguish the concept from the sphere of state and the market, to refer to '. . .a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication' (p. ix). Taking his inspiration from Gramsci, Chatterjee questions in specifically post-colonial situations the dominating reliance on civil society (the sphere of private associational life), because it denotes the activity of the modernising, nationalist elites and not the masses of people. For the latter he relies on the concept of political society. The relationship between the colonial and post-colonial state towards the general population was to rely less on civil society associations, but to directly target them using political mechanisms. He admits that this kind of politics is not limited to political parties, but involves a 'site of strategic manoeuvres, resistance and appropriation by different groups and classes. . . not always consistent with the principles of association of civil society' (Chatterjee, 2003) .
